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ABSTRACT
PRICE BUNDLING IN ONLINE TRAVEL MARKETS: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY
SEPTEMBER 2007
JINHOO KIM, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David C. Bojanic

Price bundling, offering two or more separate products/services together in a
single package at a different price from the sum of the components’ prices, is one of the
most prevalent marketing practices in many industries, including hospitality and travel.
Virtually all types of firms in the hospitality and travel industry, from suppliers such as
hotels and airlines to intermediaries such as travel agents, are encouraging customers to
purchase travel “packages” rather than a single component of travel.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the practice of price bundling
by online travel agents is associated with actual monetary savings to consumers.
Conventional economics theories generally assume that price bundling results in
consumer savings in comparison with purchasing the same component products
separately, and this is what travel agents are highlighting in their advertisements for
selling travel packages. This study also investigated whether the magnitude of bundle
discounts vary by four relevant variables such as travel agent, destination city, hotel
class, and the timing of purchase.
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The results show that purchasing a travel bundle results in significantly lower
consumer prices than purchasing the component products separately. However, the
magnitude of the bundle savings is inconsistent across the relevant variables. In
particular, Travelocity tends to offer significantly greater bundle savings than Expedia;
bundles including upper-class hotels appear to provide greater absolute discounts than
lower-class-hotel bundles, but those two are not significantly different in terms of
percentage discounts. Some important implications of the results are discussed, along
with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Price bundling, offering two or more separate products/services together in a
single package at a different price from the sum of the components’ prices, is one of the
most prevalent marketing practices in many industries. The following examples show
that bundling is implemented in a wide variety of forms, in almost all kinds of markets.


Many telecommunication and cable companies offer
bundling of different products/services usually at a special
discount price. For example, Comcast is offering several
combinations of its services (i.e., internet access, phone,
and cable) as a single bundle.



Bundling is also common in the restaurant industry. Most
restaurants provide “set menus” that bundle several
complementary menu items (e.g., appetizer, entrée, dessert,
and beverage) at discounted prices. McDonald’s various
“Value Meals” are good examples of bundling, and
although it may seem less straightforward, buffet meal is
also one form of bundling.



In the software industry, Microsoft’s MS Office, which
contains several different software titles (e.g., Word, Excel,
PowerPoint, Access, etc.) in a package, is a typical form of
bundling. The company also infamously monopolized the
Web-browser market by bundling its less attractive Internet

1

Explorer with its dominant operating system, MS Windows.
As Stremersch and Tellis (2002) points out, the landmark
antitrust case against Microsoft was, at the core, a case
against this bundling of Windows 95 and the Internet
Explorer.


The digitized music industry provides another example of
bundling. Downloading an entire music album, a bundle of
several singles, is usually cheaper than downloading the
included singles separately.

The travel industry is not exempt from the extensive use of bundling strategies.
Virtually all types of firms in the industry, from suppliers such as hotels and airlines to
intermediaries such as travel agents, are encouraging customers to purchase travel
“packages” rather than a single component of travel. For example, the top three pureplay online travel agents based on the number of bookings for 2004 (i.e., Expedia,
Travelocity, and Orbitz) advertise that consumers can obtain significant savings by
booking more than one component of travel together compared with booking the same
components separately.
The prevalence of bundling suggests that this practice is of benefit to consumers
as well as firms. As to the bundling of travel products, given the advertisements of the
online travel agents, the “price discount” seems to be the most significant benefit
consumers can realize through choosing bundles. For a couple of reasons, however,
figuring out the savings amounts of bundled travel packages is not as simple and clear
as calculating the savings of McDonald’s Value Meals.
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First, travel by its nature consists of many different components (e.g., flights,
hotel stays, car rentals, activities, etc.), and each of the components also has a number
of unique attributes that affect its prices. As a consequence, the savings amounts of a
travel package, if any, can vary whenever consumers modify its components.
Moreover, most travel products are usually distributed through different channels, and
the travel industry suppliers are renowned for implementing dynamic pricing strategies.
Hence, even if a consumer confirms that booking a package is cheaper than booking the
components separately within a travel agent’s website, it may not be cheaper compared
with the same offerings from other intermediaries or suppliers. Although the Internet
has continuously reduced search costs, comparing and evaluating all these alternatives
still require a noticeable amount of time and effort of consumers.
In this context, this paper attempts to examine whether booking travel
“packages” at online travel agents’ websites indeed results in “savings,” compared with
booking the same components separately either within the same websites or at the
component suppliers’ websites. In addition, the study is designed to investigate
whether the saving effect of bundling varies depending on such variables as destination
city, hotel class (i.e., segment), and the timing of booking (i.e., how far in advance a
travel product is booked).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical
literature on price bundling and identifies the forms of and rationales for the price
bundling strategies currently implemented by online travel agents. Chapter 3 defines
the research questions to be examined in this paper, and presents the methods for
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collecting and analyzing data. Chapter 4 presents the results and Chapter 5 discusses
their implications with some limitations of this paper.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Forms of Price Bundling
Following the classification of Adams and Yellen (1976), price bundling may
occur in one of three strategic forms: pure components, pure bundling, and mixed
bundling strategies. Pure components strategy, also known as unbundling
(Schmalensee, 1984; Stremersch and Tellis, 2002) or separate pricing (Simon and
Wuebker, 1999), simply refers to selling products only separately. Pure bundling,
sometimes called tie-in sales (Guiltinan, 1987), refers to selling the products only in
package form. In this case, the products are available only in the bundled form, and
cannot be purchased separately. Mixed bundling refers to a strategy in which a firm
offers its products separately as well as a bundle. Guiltinan (1987) further classifies
mixed bundling into two forms: mixed-leader bundling and mixed-joint bundling. In
mixed-leader bundling, the price for one product in a bundle is discounted only when
the other product (i.e., leading product) is purchased at its regular price. The mixedjoint bundling, in contrast, sets a discounted price for the bundle itself, not for an
individual product in the bundle.
The top three pure-play online travel agents, without exception, are employing
the mixed-joint bundling. On these websites, consumers can choose all available travel
products (e.g., flights, hotels, car rentals, activities, etc.) either separately or as a
bundle. Moreover, when consumers choose several travel products together as a
bundle, the new discounted price is set for the bundle, rather than for each component in
the bundle. Such prevalence and homogeneity of the bundling strategies employed by

5

the online travel agents naturally evoke some questions. What benefits of price
bundling make it so popular? Why do the firms use the same form of price bundling: is
the mixed-joint bundling superior to the other alternatives, that is, mixed-leader or pure
bundling? The next two sections seek to answers these questions.
Rationales Behind Price Bundling
Leverage Theory
The earliest explanation for bundling was developed by the U.S. courts through
a long line of cases mostly under the antitrust laws (Whinston, 1990). Often called
“leverage theory” (e.g., Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann, 1990; Whinston, 1990), this
perspective regards pure-bundling as a device for a firm to profitably extend its
monopoly power from one market to another. Whinston (1990) articulates this idea as
follows: “Tying provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one
market can use the leverage provided by its power to foreclose sales in, and thereby
monopolize, a second market” (p. 837).
Because leverage theory focuses entirely on the pure bundling of a monopolist,
it cannot appropriately explain the online travel agents’ motivations for price bundling.
First of all, pure bundling is far less common than mixed bundling in the online travel
market. In addition, it is apparent that even the leading online travel agent—according
to PhoCusWright, Expedia held the largest share with 41.2% of the online travel
market, based on the number of bookings for 2004 (Mintel Report: Internet Travel
Booking, U.S., September 2005)—does not have sufficient monopoly power over any
product it sells. Consumers can usually book most travel products through numerous
sellers such as other online agents, brick-and-mortar agents, Internet portals, or the
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suppliers. Hence, this paper does not discuss the leverage theory further, and
concentrates on several more relevant motivations of online travel agents for price
bundling: cost and demand side incentives.
Cost Associated Benefits
Many observers note that bundling can generate cost savings in production,
distribution, or transactions (e.g., Adams and Yellen, 1976; Bakos and Brynjolfsson,
1999; Eppen, Hanson, and Martin 1991; Guiltinan, 1987; Jeuland, 1984; Stremersch
and Tellis, 2002). The discussions in this regard, though, are often limited and
informal, inconsistent in the use of terms, or sometimes not pertinent to the price
bundling itself. 1 Nevertheless, most literature seems to base its explanations, explicitly
or implicitly, on the concept of “economies of scope.” Panzar and Willig (1981) define
the term “economies of scope” as a property of production in which “it is less costly to
combine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce them separately.” They
ascribe these cost reductions to the presence of sharable inputs, which once prepared for
the production of one output, would be also usable for the production of other products.
If the costs of utilizing the sharable inputs for the production of more than one product
are subadditive (i.e., less than the total costs of utilizing the same inputs separately for
the individual production of the same outputs), firms have strong incentive to realize
cost savings by jointly producing or offering the products (Panzar and Willig, 1981).
With price bundling, the firms can set appropriate prices for bundles, thereby
encouraging consumers to purchase the bundles, which are the cheapest to produce,
instead of individual products (Hanson and Martin, 1990).
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Although online travel agents, as intermediaries, do not indeed “produce” most
products they sell, this cost-associated explanation provides valuable insight to the
understanding of their bundling behavior. As Guiltinan (1987) describes, service
businesses tend to have a high degree of cost sharing, and the demands for the services
offered by a firm are generally interdependent; online travel agents are not exempt from
these characteristics. For example, once a consumer decides to book a round-trip flight
through an online travel agent, encouraging the consumer to book hotel accommodation
as well would be less costly than marketing the same hotel to another potential
consumer (i.e., interdependence in demand). In addition, the marginal costs of
providing “additional” products to the customer would be generally lower than the
marginal costs of providing the “initial” product (e.g., in terms of processing customers’
inquiries, requests, or complaints); that is, there exist subadditive costs. Therefore,
selling different travel products together as a bundle is an effective way for online travel
agents to reduce both marketing and operational costs.
This paper finds another quasi-cost-side rationale which results from the
strategic motivation of travel product suppliers. The perishability of their products
makes it difficult for service businesses to synchronize supply and demand (Zeithaml,
Parasuraman, and Berry, 1985). In the travel industry, for example, hotel rooms and
airline seats not sold today cannot be inventoried or saved for future sales.
Furthermore, like online travel agents, travel suppliers also have high fixed-to-variable
costs ratios. These two features together result in an incentive for the suppliers to sell
off the unsold rooms or seats, even at heavily discounted prices. At the same time, they
may not want consumers to know about these unusually low prices because such
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inconsistent pricing could negatively affect consumer perceptions of the price and
quality, and in turn, the value of discounted products. If all these assumptions hold
true, it is persuasive to hypothesize that many travel suppliers provide their products to
the agents at lower than regular rates, attaching a condition that such discounts are
eligible exclusively for the products sold as a bundle with different types of travel
products. In fact, several practitioners in the hotel industry have recently mentioned in
a conference that they use travel agents’ bundling as a “device to sell off distressed
inventory while protecting brand value and maintaining an opaque price” (Garrow,
Ferguson, Keskinocak, and Swann, 2006). From the agents’ perspectives, bundling can
in fact “lower” the costs of the products, thereby providing the opportunity to achieve
more profits from the same products.
In summary, these cost-associated approaches show that online travel agents can
reduce costs through bundling, and thereby achieve greater profits from the same
products. Such cost savings through bundling stem in large part from two major
sources: (1) economies of scope and (2) travel suppliers’ motivation to discount unsold
products without undermining consumer perceptions of the price and value of
discounted products.
However, cost-side approaches have a couple of problems. First, it is still
ambiguous which form of bundling, pure or mixed bundling, is more effective in
pricing products or services. After all, the amounts of cost savings from bundling,
whether they are due to economies of scope or the strategic motivation of suppliers, do
not vary much between these two forms of bundling (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002).
Second, while bundling indeed lowers online travel agents’ costs, it does not necessarily
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lead to the conclusion that the price for a bundle is significantly lower than the sum of
prices for the individual products in the bundle. That is, for some reason, online travel
agents might not pass on those cost savings entirely to the prices of bundles (e.g.,
bundling may provide consumers with greater convenience and savings in transaction
costs; these benefits may lead to increases in the bundle prices). These issues are
addressed in the following sections.
Demand Associated Benefits
A large portion of the economics and marketing literature has focused on the
demand-side benefits of bundling, the benefits resulting from consumer heterogeneity in
the valuations of the same products. Using rigorous models or stylized examples, this
line of research demonstrates that bundling can sort customers into groups with
different reservation prices (i.e., the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay for a
product) and thereby enable firms to extract greater consumer surplus (i.e., the amount
by which the individual’s reservation price exceeds the actual price paid) from the same
products. The following hypothetical example using travel products illustrates this
benefit of bundling clearly.
Suppose that an online travel agent sells air flights and hotel accommodations.
Suppose further that there are three consumers and their reservation prices for a roundtrip air flight, the same nights of hotel stay, and the bundle (i.e., flight + hotel stay) are
revealed as in Table 1.
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Table 1: Reservation Price for Air Flight, Hotel, and the Bundle
Reservation Prices ($)
Flight
Hotel
Bundle
1
1,000
250
1,250
2
800
400
1,200
3
300
700
1,000
 This example is slightly adapted from those in Stigler (1963), Guiltinan (1987),
Tellis (1986), and Simon and Wuebker (1999).
Consumer

If the online travel agent uses an unbundling strategy (i.e., price the two
products separately), he will set $800 for the flight and $400 for the hotel, hence
receiving $1,600 from the sale of flight and $800 from the sale of hotel. The total
received will be $2,400, which is the maximum achievable amount under the given
consumer reservation prices, with consumer 1 buying only a flight, consumer 2 buying
both, and consumer 3 buying only a hotel stay.
With pure bundling, the agent will set $1,000 for the bundle. All consumers will
buy the bundle for $1,000, because the price is either equal to (e.g., for consumer 1), or
smaller than (e.g., for consumers 2 and 3) their reservation prices. The agent’s total
maximum revenue will increase to $3,000, which is 25% higher than the revenue
achieved with the unbundling strategy.
If mixed bundling is available, the travel agent will set $800 for the flight, $700
for the hotel, and $1,200 for the bundle (i.e., 20% discount). Under these prices,
consumers 1 and 2 both buy the bundle and consumer 3 buys only a hotel stay. The
travel agent’s total revenue further increases to $3,100, which is even 3.3% greater than
the amount achievable with pure bundling strategy.
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As stated earlier, these revenue increases come from the more effective
extraction of consumer surplus. Table 2 shows how the consumer surplus in this
example becomes smaller as the travel agent employs pure bundling and mixed
bundling strategies. Consumers can enjoy a total of $500 of consumer surplus with
unbundling (i.e., separate pricing). This amount decreases to $450 if the travel agent
adopts pure bundling strategy, and decreases even further to $50 with the introduction
of mixed bundling strategy.
Table 2: Consumer Surplus Under Unbundling, Pure Bundling, and Mixed
Bundling
Pure
Bundling

Unbundling
Prices ($)
Consumer Surplus from:

PF = 800
PH = 400
Flight
Hotel

PB = 1,000
Bundle

Mixed Bundling
PF = 800, PH = 700
PB = 1,200
Flight
Hotel Bundle

Consumer 1
200
N/A
250
N/A
N/A
50
Consumer 2
0
0
200
N/A
N/A
0
Consumer 3
N/A
300
0
N/A
0
N/A
 Consumer Surplus ($) = Reservation Price – Price
 PF, PH, and PB represent the prices of flight, hotel, and the flight + hotel bundle.
 N/A represents a consumer does not purchase the product since its price exceeds her
reservation price. In contrast, 0 (zero) means that a consumer actually purchases the
product, but cannot enjoy any positive consumer surplus because the price she pays
is equal to her reservation price.

This simple example indicates that bundling has an ability to generate greater
revenue than unbundling, and furthermore, mixed bundling may work better than pure
bundling in increasing revenues. However, it should be noted that this example holds
true only under a number of strict assumptions on consumer reservation prices, market
competition, costs, the number of products, etc., hence it is rather difficult to apply this
example to more general situations. Indeed, most bundling literature in economics and
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marketing after Stigler (1968) can be considered a series of attempts to examine the
relative optimality of the three bundling strategies (i.e., unbundling, pure bundling, and
mixed bundling) under various assumptions and create more generally applicable
principles. Table 3 summarizes important studies in this stream.
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Table 3: Bundling Literature Concerning the Demand-side Rationales for
Bundling
Study
Stigler (1968)

Adams and Yellen
(1976)

Schmalensee (1984)

Contributions and Findings
 Widely believed to articulate this idea first using the
famous example regarding “block booking” of movies.
 Showed how bundling can increase sellers’ profits when
consumer valuations for two goods are “negatively
correlated” (i.e., one consumer values a product higher
than another consumer, whereas the former values another
product lower than the latter; for example, consumer 1 and
2 in Table 1 have a higher reservation price for flight than
consumer 3, whilst they have a lower reservation price for
hotel than consumer 3).
 Developed Sigler’s idea on a two-dimensional,
diagrammatic “reservation price” space, and formally
showed that bundling can increase profits if the valuations
of the two goods are negatively correlated.
 Assuming a multi-product monopolist, two goods, no
resale among buyers, and independence in consumer
reservation prices (i.e., the value of a bundle to customers
is equal to the sum of the individual value of its
components, also known as the additivity assumption) 2 ,
compared the optimality of three strategies.
 Through numerous experiments covering a wide range of
cost structures and customer reservation prices, found
“some forms of” bundling to be more profitable than
unbundling.
 Assumed the distribution of reservation prices in the
Adams-Yellen framework to be bivariate normal, all the
other assumptions being equal, and showed that bundling
facilitates more efficient extraction of consumers’ surplus
by reducing the heterogeneity in their reservation prices.
 Showed that pure bundling ca enhance profits even when
consumers’ reservation prices are positively correlated, as
long as they are not perfectly correlated.
 Concluded that mixed bundling combines the advantages
of pure bundling and unbundled sales, and it generally
generates more profits than either: “This policy enables the
seller to reduce effective heterogeneity among those
buyers with high reservation prices for both goods, while
still selling at a high markup to those buyers willing to pay
a high price for only one of the goods.” (p. S229).
(To be continued in the following page)
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Guiltinan (1987)





McAfee et al. (1989)




Salinger (1995)





Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1999)




Stremersch and Tellis
(2003)







(Continued from the previous page)
Relaxed two strict assumptions of previous economics
literature, independence in consumer reservation prices
(i.e., the additivity assumption) and monopoly, to consider
the complementarity 3 among products and market
competition.
Provided four specific conditions under which each
possible combination of bundling types (i.e., mixed-joint
vs. mixed-leader) 4 and firms’ objectives (i.e., cross-selling
vs. new customer acquisition) are most likely to be
successful.
Investigated the demand conditions under which bundling
is more profitable than unbundling in the Adams and
Yellen (1976) model.
Demonstrated that mixed bundling dominates pure
bundling and unbundling whenever reservation prices for
various products are independently distributed among
consumers.
Developed a graphical framework to analyze the
profitability and welfare implications of pure bundling.
Explicitly considered cost saving effects, as well as
demand effects, of bundling.
Affirmed the results of previous economics research (i.e.,
bundling is generally more profitable than unbundling
when reservation prices are negatively correlated). In
addition, found that if bundling lowers costs, it tends to be
more profitable when demands for the components are
highly positively correlated and component costs are high.
Considered the bundling of large numbers of information
goods with zero or very low marginal cost.
Found that the profitability of bundling becomes greater
when marginal costs of reproducing information goods are
low or when customer valuations are negatively correlated.
Synthesizing the results of previous bundling literature,
suggested 12 propositions that prescribe the optimal
bundling strategy depending on five important factors: (1)
consumers’ reservation prices; (2) objectives of the firm;
(3) competition; (4) costs; and (5) consumer perceptions of
bundles.
Suggested that price bundling (either pure or mixed) yields
higher revenues than unbundling if conditional reservation
prices for two products are negatively correlated across
customers (proposition 1).
Proposed that mixed bundling dominates pure bundling
only when reservation prices for the “bundle” vary across
customers (proposition 2).
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Based on these previous studies, this paper concludes that, at least under some
conditions, mixed bundling is superior to pure bundling and unbundling in increasing
sellers’ profits. The most important conditions for successful bundling seem to be
either heterogeneity in consumer valuations for the products (either for the component
products or the bundle) or cost savings resulting from bundling. To the best knowledge
of the author, there has been no formal research examining whether or not these
conditions, especially the demand conditions, hold true in the online travel industry.
However, the pervasive use of the mixed bundling strategy in the real world leads the
author to presume that either demand conditions or cost conditions, or both, hold true.
That is, some consumers might value hotel accommodation higher than air flight whilst
some others value the flight higher than the accommodation (i.e., negatively correlated
reservation prices for individual products). Also, consumers might have quite different
reservation prices for the same bundle of travel products. In addition to these demandside rationales, cost reductions, which are caused by economies of scope and/or travel
suppliers’ strategic motivation to sell off unsold travel products without harming the
brands, leads the online travel agents to employ the mixed bundling strategy
extensively.
Optimal Pricing of a Bundle
We can now understand why online travel agents offer travel “packages” as well
as individual travel products and under what conditions mixed bundling is more
profitable than either pure bundling or unbundling. However, there remains a question
regarding the pricing of a bundle. That is, what prices should be set for a bundle and
for its component products under mixed bundling?
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Most of the previously reviewed studies explicitly or implicitly assume that
mixed bundling accompanies discounts. Indeed, as Adams and Yellen (1976)
acknowledge, the additivity assumption (i.e., independence in demand), which is very
common in traditional economics bundling literature, makes mixed bundling a distinct
strategy only if the price for a bundle is lower than the sum of the prices for its
component products; otherwise, nobody would buy the bundle. In addition, if bundling
indeed brings about considerable cost savings and the market is competitive rather than
monopolistic, firms will probably have strong motivation to offer discounts for bundled
sales.
However, there are at least two appealing reasons to doubt the idea that bundling
is necessarily coupled with considerable discounts: complementarity among bundled
products and consumer difficulty in evaluating the savings. First, as Guiltinan (1987)
stressed, consumers’ reservation prices for a bundle may exceed the sum of the
reservation prices for the component products when the two products have a
complementary relationship. He identifies three possible sources of this complementary
relationship: search economies (i.e., savings in customer time and effort), enhanced
customer satisfaction, and improved total image or credibility of the seller. Obviously,
many customers will appreciate the convenience of booking several travel products in
one place, and hence, may be willing to pay more for this convenience of one-stop
shopping. Second, as stated in the introduction, consumers may have difficulty in
evaluating the relative savings purchasing a bundle yields. If these conditions hold true,
the price for a bundle might not represent a true monetary savings as generally
advertised by firms or believed by consumers.
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Considering the prevalent use of bundling strategies, prior literature on the
optimal bundle “pricing” is surprisingly scant. Using mixed integer linear
programming, Hanson and Martin (1987) provide a practical model for a profitmaximizing monopolist to determine optimal bundle prices under a wide variety of cost
and reservation price conditions. However, the model does not provide more generally
applicable insights into predicting bundle prices of travel products because it requires
the exact data on customer reservation prices, through a case-specific questionnaire, as
well as the actual cost data of a particular firm.
Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993) develop a probabilistic model for determining
optimal prices of a bundle and/or its component products under unbundling, pure
bundling, and mixed bundling strategies. They apply the model to pricing ten single
music/dance performance tickets and the season ticket, which is in this case the bundle
of the ten individual performances over a certain time period. The results are consistent
with the traditional view that mixed bundling yields more profits than the others. The
results also confirmed that mixed bundling generally occurs with considerable discounts
on the bundle: the optimal prices were $14 for the single ticket and $55 for the season
ticket. However, this model did not consider complementary relationships among the
products. Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) develop another pricing model that
considers the degree of complementarity or substitutability among products. The model
suggests that a bundle of complements be priced higher than a bundle of individually
valued products under mixed bundling. 5
The study most similar to this paper is Estelami (1999). Based on the same
reasons as stated before (i.e., consumer difficulty in evaluating the savings and
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complementarity among bundled products), Estelami hypothesizes that sellers may not
offer discounts but charge premiums for complementary bundles. To test this
hypothesis, he measured the magnitude of bundle savings for three product categories:
fast food meals, photographic equipment, and personal computers. The results show
that consumers save about 8%, on average, by purchasing a bundle instead of
purchasing its component products separately. However, about 8.8% of all the
observed bundles returned higher prices than the sum of the individual prices of the
component products. While there are some differences in terms of the frequency, from
4% in fast-food meals to 12% in personal computers, this “bundle surcharge” occurred
in all three product categories without exception. Although this empirical study did not
measure the prices of travel products, the results cast doubts on the common belief that
purchasing travel products as a bundle returns significantly cheaper prices than
purchasing the same products separately.
Bundling Literature in the Travel Setting
Given the prevalent use of price bundling in the travel industry, relatively little
research has examined the subject in the hospitality and tourism context in particular.
Kinberg and Sudit (1979) developed an algorithm for the determination of
appropriate bundle mix and bundle price in the international travel industry, both in the
travel agency level (i.e., bundlings of air transportation and land-travel arrangements as
well as bundlings of more than one international destinations) and on the resort level
(i.e., mix of various recreational amenities and services). The authors premised their
algorithm on the assumption that “bundles of air transportation and land arrangements
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(e.g., hotel accommodation or rent-a-car) are priced, as a rule, at least in the travel
agency level, lower than the sum price of the individual components.”
As reviewed earlier, there are two cornerstones for a price bundling strategy to
be profitable: (1) the determination of consumer demand (i.e., reservation prices) on
bundles and individual products as well, and (2) the identification of the costs of
offering various bundles. Stressing this point, Bojanic and Calantone (1990) presented
a framework which derives consumer preferences (i.e., reservation prices) for varios
individual products and bundles, using the technique of conjoint analysis, and forecasts
the changes in sales volume associated with different combinations of individual
products/services, using a logit choice model. The profitability of alternative bundling
strategies then can be determioned by combining the sales forecast with relevant costs
of providing the various bundles and the prices at which the bundles may be offered.
Naylor and Frank (2001) reported that some consumers prefer purchasing
bundles of various travel services to purchasing the component products separately
because doing so simplifies search and purchase decision processes. In a longitudinal
study conducted across first-time and repeat guests at an upscale resort/spa, the authors
found that providing an all-inclusive package, even if actual monetary outlay was
higher, would significantly increase perceptions of value for first-time consumers in
particular.
The studies cited in the preceding paragraphs are not specifically related to the
subject of this paper. However, each study has some parts demonstrating that the use of
price bundling in the hospitality and travel setting does not contradict, at least in general,
the theories and assumptions established in economics and marketing literature. First,
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consumer reservation prices for individual travel products and bundles, along with the
costs of providing the bundles, determine the optimal bundling strategy (i.e., whether or
not to employ price bundling strategy, what bundles to provide, and what prices to set).
More important, as assumed in most economics and marketing literature, travel bundles
seem to be offered at discounted prices, compared with the sum of the individual prices
of component products, while complementarity among bundled products might increase
the prices of bundles.
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Notes
1

For example, one stream of the explanations focuses on the relative contribution
margin of different products. This view argues that, if a firm’s products have high
contribution margin ratios (i.e., the prices of the products are relatively higher than the
variable costs), price bundling coupled with discounts can be an effective way to
increase the profits. Eppen et al. (1991) and Stremersch and Tellis (2002) illustrate this
idea using similar examples as follows. Suppose that a company considers offering a
bundle of its two products, X and Y. Let product X be sold for $100 and Y for $200,
and the company price the bundle of X and Y at $270 (10% discount). In this case, the
effectiveness of price bundling depends on the extent product X and Y have
contribution margins. If both products have relatively low contribution margins, say,
30% and 40% respectively, 10% discount for the bundle will require more than a 38%
increase in demand to make the bundling more profitable than status quo. By contrast,
if both products have relatively high contribution margins, say, 70% and 80%
respectively, a demand increase of only 15% will offset the profit loss due to the same
10% discount for the bundle. However, what this illustration indeed demonstrates is
that discounts on high-margin products are better than discounts on low-margin
products in increasing profits. That is, it is still ambiguous why firms bundle their
products rather than just discount the prices of individual high-margin products.
2

This is one of common assumption in the economics literature. Guiltinan (1987)
called it the assumption of “strict additivity.”
3

In contrast to the additivity assumption, complementarity means that the reservation
price for the bundle exceeds the sum of the reservation prices for the component
products because the perceived value of one product is increased if the other is
purchased (Guiltinan, 1987).
4

Implicitly assuming that mixed bundling is at least more profitable than pure bundling,
Guiltinan (1987) entirely focused on the either form of mixed bundling: mixed-leader
and mixed-joint.
5

They computed component prices as percentages of the corresponding bundle prices.
They also suggest charging higher prices (compared with those for independently
valued products) for most substitutes as well as complements. Because a consumer’s
reservation price for a substitutive bundle is lower than the sum of the reservation prices
for the component products, this suggestion is contrary to common belief.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
Hypotheses
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing within an Agent
The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether purchasing travel
bundles yields savings compared with purchasing the component products separately.
As reviewed earlier, most bundling literature in economics and marketing suggests that
mixed bundling accompany discounts. Although the two factors, complementarity
among bundled products and consumer difficulty in assessing the savings amounts, may
negatively affect the amounts of consumer savings from bundling, there has been no
conclusive evidence that these negative effects are large enough to cause bundle
premium or surcharge. Hence, this paper hypothesizes directionally (i.e., one-tailed
tests) as follows:

H1 (0): Within the same online travel agent’s website, there is no significant
difference in the prices of travel products between purchasing them as
a bundle and purchasing them separately.
H1 (A): Within the same online travel agent’s website, purchasing a bundle
yields significantly discounted prices than purchasing the component
products separately.

Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing from Suppliers
Most travel bundles are offered by travel agents, which, as an intermediary, can
create a wide variety of bundles by combining different types of travel products. In
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contrast, “separate purchasing (i.e., unbundling)” can also occur when consumers
purchase more than one travel products directly from the suppliers’ own websites.
Therefore, bundle savings at online travel agents’ websites can be measured in
comparison to the sum of the prices consumers pay for purchasing the same component
products at each supplier’s own website. As in the first hypotheses, there has been no
theoretical or empirical evidence that separate purchasing from individual suppliers
yields greater savings than purchasing them as a bundle from online travel agents.
Therefore, following the prevalent assumption of most bundling literature, this paper
predicts that purchasing a travel bundle from online travel agents yields cheaper prices
even compared with purchasing the same component products separately from the
suppliers.

H2 (0): There is no significant difference in the online prices of travel
products between purchasing them as a bundle from online travel
agents and separately from the suppliers’ own websites.
H2 (A): Purchasing a travel bundle from online travel agents yields
significantly discounted prices than purchasing the component
products separately from the sellers’ own websites.

Difference in the Magnitude of Bundle Savings Between Online Travel Agents
This paper also expects that the amounts of bundle savings, measured within an
agent, will vary by online travel agents. In other words, the test results of H1 and H2
may not be similar between different online travel agents. Setting prices for indivisual
travel products and bundles, and thereby deciding how much monetary discounts to
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offer to consumers, is to a great extent a travel agent’s strategic decision. In addition,
suppliers may provide a travel product to an agent at a cheaper price than to other
agents, depending on, for example, the market share or bargaining power of the agents.
This paper tests this idea using the following hypothesis. Because there is no sufficient
reason to expect one of the two online travel agents will offer significantly greater
bundle discounts than the other, two-tailed tests are used.

H3 (0): There is no significant difference in the magnitude of bundle savings
between online travel agents.
H3 (A): There is significant difference in the magnitude of bundle savings
between online travel agents.

Travel Attributes Affecting the Level of Bundle Savings
The last objective of this paper is to investigate whether bundle savings vary
depending on the attributes of products included in a travel bundle. Three relevant
attributes are selected as follows: (1) destination city, (2) hotel class (i.e., segment), and
(3) the timing of purchase (i.e., how far in advance a bundle is purchased).

H4 (0): There is no significant difference in the bundle savings between two
destination cities (i.e., Orlando and San Antonio).
H4 (A): There is significant difference in the bundle savings between two
destination cities (i.e., Orlando and San Antonio).
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Both cities are large and have major hotel chains. However, Orlando has a
higher volume of tourists and more hotels per capita. This might result in a more
competitive market and more discounts in Orlando, especially during the lower demand
(i.e., non peak) travel periods. However, little has been demonstrated about the
differences in the two travel markets. Thus, this paper uses two-tailed hypotheses.

H5 (0): There is no significant difference in the bundle savings between
lower-class hotels and upper-class hotels.
H5 (A): There is significant difference in the bundle savings between lowerclass hotels and upper-class hotels.

Lower-class hotels and upper-class hotels probably face different demand and
cost conditions, thereby behaving differently in the use of price bundling strategy. It is
uncertain how the different demand conditions affect the amount of bundle discounts.
As to the cost condition, yet, more expensive hotels might have higher profit margins
and therefore are likely to provide more latitude for a larger absolute discounts, even
though the percentage discounts might not differ. As in Hypothesis 4, yet, two-tailed
hypotheses were constructed because little has been known about the relationship
between hotel class and the amounts of bundle discounts.
Last, as to the effect of purchase timing, the author expects there might be more
potential for savings the earlier you book a travel package (hotel’s occupancy would be
less, the further ahead). However, yield management procedures would result in price
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changes throughout the cycle and we could see movement in both directions based on
actual pickup vs. historical pickup.

H6 (0): There is no significant difference in the bundle savings among
different timings of purchase (i.e., 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months
ahead of departure).
H6 (A): There is significant difference in the bundle savings among different
timings of purchase.

Data Sources and Collection Methods
To test the proposed hypotheses, this paper observed the prices of 239 travel
bundles, 119 from Expedia and 120 from Travelocity. For each travel bundle, two
types of unbundled prices (i.e., one within the same agent, and the other from the
suppliers’ own websites) were also recorded, then the magnitudes of within-agent
savings and versus-supplier savings were calculated.
Three relevant prices for a travel bundle (i.e., bundled price, unbundled price
within the same travel agent, unbundled price from suppliers’ own online reservation
sites) were collected virtually spontaneously to avoid any possible price changes due to
systematic price changes based on demand and supply. For the same reason, all prices
for a specific timing of purchase were collected approximately within the same week, in
the order of one-month, three-months, and six-months advanced booking. In addition,
the pace of data collection was matched across the two online travel agents. The data
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collection occurred during the first three weeks in July 2007. More details of the data
and the collection procedures are presented in the following sections.
Online Travel Agent
The travel bundles in the sample were chosen from two market-leading online
travel agents, Expedia and Travelocity. According to Mintel Report (2005), Expedia
was the largest (41.2%) and Travelocity was the second largest (19.6%) pure-play
online travel agent, based on the number of bookings for 2004. Despite auction-style
online travel agents (e.g., Priceline) have been becoming more important in online
travel markets, this paper excludes them. Such firms allow consumers to name their
own price, and the final price remains opaque until the bid is accepted. Obviously,
prices obtained through this process are not directly comparable to those offered by
typical online travel agents or suppliers.
Origin
This paper used the same origin, Chicago O’Hare Airport, for the two
destination cities. Chicago O’Hare Airport is one of the biggest airports in the nation
and is believed to provide comprehensive flight schedules to both Orlando and San
Antonio. In addition, the distances from Chicago to both destination cities are almost
the same (i.e., approximately 2 hours and 40 minates when using a non-stop flight),
therefore not affecting the magnitude of bundle savings by destination.
Duration of a Travel
The duration of a travel was set into 7 nights starting from a Sturday (i.e.,
Saturday to the next Saturday) for all travel bundles in the sample. For example, if
prices were observed on July 7th, the nearest Saturday from August 7th was chosen to
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be a departing date for 1-month advanced booking. Hotels and airlines usually set
considerably different prices between weekday and weekend reservations, and this
practice could affect the amount of bundle discounts. 7 nights starting from a Saturday
eliminate the bias due to this pricing practice. Also, it is the most popular length of
time for Disney vacations.
Hotel Class
Expedia and Travelocity use slightly different star-rating systems. In order to
compare bundle savings by hotel class, it is necessary to apply an identical
classification method to the “hotel + flight” bundles selected from different travel
agents. Although a number of different hotel classification methods are employed in
hospitality literature and in the industry (e.g., O’Connor, 2003; O’Neill, 2003), most of
them focus on rating hotel chains, rather than a specific property, and do not provide
ratings for independent hotels. For this reason, this paper followed Expedia’s ratings,
which classifies all properties listed into 9 segments (i.e., 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5,
5). The class of hotels selected from Travelocity was adjusted according to the
classification provided by Expedia. Lower-class hotels in hypothesis 4 were chosen
from 2.5 star and 2 star segments, whereas upper-class hotels were mostly chosen from
4 star and higher segments (a few 3.5 star hotels were included in the sample to
acquire minimum number of observations).
Selection of Flights
When building a travel bundle, this paper only specified origin and destination
airports (i.e., from Chicago to either Orlando or San Antonio), departing and returning
dates, and the number of travelers (i.e., one adult). That is, other important
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information about flights (e.g., departing and returning times, carriers, class of seats,
number of stops, etc.) was not specified. Then, the flights the agents suggest as the
first choice for the bundle were accepted as they are without additional modification.
This is because pilot data indicated that the travel agents normally suggest from the
cheapest available tickets and provide the lowest number of transfers possible at the
lowest price. If so, at least as to the research hypotheses of this study, there is no
reason to modify the suggested flights intentionally.
However, some complex flights, which include more than one carriers for a
single flight, had to be replaced with simpler flights because purchasing the
component flights separately from each airline’s online reservation site and summing
up the individual fares sometimes returned abnormally higher prices than purchasing
the same flights separately from the travel agents. When replacing a complex flight,
this paper always considered from the second alternatives the travel agents suggested.
Selection of a Travel Bundle and Record of Prices
For every possible combination of destination, departing date and returning date,
and hotel class, prices of 10 “flight + hotel” bundles were collected. The bundles were
selected from the top of the recommendation lists provided by the agents (i.e., Expedia
Picks and Travelocity Picks), based on the assumption that the agents present the most
aluable bundles first and consumers normally browse from the top of the first pages.
However, some bundles, whose separate prices could not be collected from the
suppliers, were excluded from the sample. For example, several independent hotels
did not have their own online reservation site. Sometimes the same types of rooms
and rates selected for a bundle at an agent’s website were not available at suppliers’
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own reservation websites, hence making it unreasonable to compare the bundle price
with the unbindled price.
All other identifiable attributes of a travel bundle (e.g., room type, carriers, seat
class, departure and arrival times, restrictions on tickets, etc.) were perfectly matched
across the relevant purchases from agents and suppliers. Also, special attention has
been given to prices to make sure that the prices are all-inclusive of associated taxes
and fees.
Data Structure
Table 4 shows the structure of data and the number of observations in each
condition. As indicated in the table, the grand total number of observations becomes
717 (one travel bundle purchased at Expedia for San Antonio, upper-class hotels, and 6month advanced booking was excluded because the unbundled price from the suppliers
were abnormally higher than the bundled price and unbundled price from Expedia).
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Table 4: Data Structure and the Number of Observations
Agent

Bundling

Destination

Expedia

Bundling

Orlando
San Antonio

Unbundling
(Agent)

Orlando
San Antonio

Unbundling
(Suppliers)

Orlando
San Antonio

Travelocity

Bundling

Orlando
San Antonio

Unbundling
(Agent)

Orlando
San Antonio

Unbundling
(Suppliers)

Orlando
San Antonio

Hotel
Segment
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
Upper
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Timing of Purchase
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
240
240
237

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing within an Agency
For all travel bundles collected in the sample (119 from Expedia and 120 from
Travelocity), both agents quoted discounted prices compared with the prices of separate
purchasing within the same agent.
Independent samples t tests were conducted to determine whether purchasing
two travel products as a bundle at an online travel agent results in significant discounts
compared with purchasing the same products separately from the same agent. Table 5
and 6 show that the results were different by agent. Travelocity returned significantly
lower prices for all tested combinations of hotel class and timing of purchase. Expedia,
by contrast, did not necessarily return significant bundle discounts; the amount of
discounts was significant only for the two conditions out of six tested.
Table 5: Bundle Savings Within An Agent (Expedia)
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Price
Std.
p-Value
t
(USD)
Deviation
(1-tailed)
Bundled
712.69 134.71
-1.973
.028*
Unbundled
823.45 211.87
Bundled
1,453.90 381.31
-1.405
.084
Unbundled 1,638.35 446.20
Bundled
706.78 163.47
-1.519
.069
Unbundled
802.99 231.41
Bundled
1,979.56 355.96
-2.442
.010*
Unbundled 2,265.42 383.91
Bundled
857.30 230.29
-.766
.224
Unbundled
920.21 285.92
Bundled
2,167.87 668.08
-.691
.247
Unbundled 2,317.50 666.73
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Table 6: Bundle Savings Within An Agent (Travelocity)
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Price
Std.
p-Value
t
(USD)
Deviation
(1-tailed)
Bundled
707.71 134.52
-2.454
.009*
Unbundled
844.61 210.16
Bundled
1,451.14 405.30
-2.207
.017*
Unbundled 1,766.48 494.09
Bundled
673.73 158.02
-2.396
.011*
Unbundled
823.50 230.63
Bundled
1,786.21 423.50
-3.925
.000*
Unbundled 2,298.29 401.34
Bundled
763.34 211.00
-2.072
.023*
Unbundled
914.12 247.70
Bundled
2,009.53 711.25
-1.762
.043*
Unbundled 2,443.43 844.43

Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing from Suppliers
The results showed that the prices of purchasing a travel bundle from a travel
agent are not necessarily lower than the prices of purchasing the component products
individually from each supplier. Thirty-seven bundles out of 119 (31.1%) at Expedia
did not beat the supplier prices, while 17 bundles out of 120 (14.2%) at Travelocity
returned prices higher than the supplier prices.
Independent samples t tests were used to determine whether there is significant
difference in the prices of travel products between purchasing them as a bundle from an
online travel agent and purchasing them separately from suppliers. The results were
similar in H1. As shown in Table 7 and 8, Travelocity returned significant bundle
discounts for 3-month advanced purchase, both for lower-class and upper-class hotels,
whereas Expedia failed to return significant bundle discounts for all combinations of
hotel class and timing of purchase.
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Table 7. Bundle Savings Versus Suppliers (Expedia)
Mean Price
Std.
p-Value
t
(USD)
Deviation
(1-tailed)
Lower-class hotel &
Bundled
712.68 134.71
-.871
.195
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled
758.12 190.44
Bundled
1,453.90 381.31
Upper-class hotel &
-1.503
.071
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 1,652.75 452.24
Lower-class hotel &
Bundled
706.78 163.47
-1.232
.113
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled
782.97 223.19
Upper-class hotel &
Bundled
1,979.56 355.96
-1.549
.065
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,165.33 401.05
Lower-class hotel &
Bundled
857.30 230.29
-.255
.400
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled
877.91 279.27
Upper-class hotel &
Bundled
2,167.87 668.08
-.367
.358
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,245.02 628.85
* Unbundled price here means the sum of the prices of purchasing the component
products individually from each supplier’s own website.
Description

Table 8: Bundle Savings Versus Suppliers (Travelocity)
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Price
(USD)
Bundled
Unbundled
Bundled
Unbundled
Bundled
Unbundled
Bundled
Unbundled
Bundled
Unbundled
Bundled
Unbundled

707.71
778.08
1,451.14
1,650.02
673.73
792.79
1,786.21
2,200.15
763.34
871.61
2,009.53
2,271.30

Std.
Deviation
134.52
146.76
405.30
481.47
158.02
221.82
423.50
437.24
211.00
236.73
711.25
559.24

t

p-Value
(1-tailed)

-1.581

.061

-1.413

.083

-1.955

.029*

-3.041

.002*

-1.527

.068

-1.294

.102

Difference in the Magnitude of Bundle Savings Between Online Travel Agents
To compare the average bundle savings offered by Expedia and Travelocity
(i.e., the savings measured in comparison with a separate purchase within the same
agent), independent samples t tests were conducted. As expected from the results of the
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first two hypotheses tests, these tests demonstrated that there were significant
differences in the bundle savings offered by the two online travel agents, at least under
some conditions.
Table 9 and 10 show that Travelocity tends to offer significantly greater bundle
discounts than Expedia, both measured in absolute and percentage terms. In particular,
it seems that the further in advance a travel bundle is purchased, the greater is the
amount of the difference between the two agents. In other words, there was no
significant difference in the magnitude of bundle discounts provided for one-month
advanced purchases whether it is measured in absolute or percentage terms.
Table 9: Absolute Bundle Savings* by Agent
Mean Savings
Std.
p-Value
t
(USD)
Deviation
(2-tailed)
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
110.76 114.97
-.757
.454
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity
136.90 103.19
Upper-class hotel &
Expedia
184.44 163.36
-1.959
.057
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity
315.34 250.17
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
96.21
95.11
-1.610
.116
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity
149.77 114.40
Expedia
285.86 335.14
Upper-class hotel &
-1.939
.060
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity
512.08 400.00
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
62.92
78.09
-2.942
.006*
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity
150.79 108.36
Upper-class hotel &
Expedia
149.63 150.82
-3.778
.001*
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity
440.33 301.34
* Bundle savings here and in Table 10 means the savings in comparison with
purchasing the component products individually from the same agent.
Description
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Table 10: Percentage Bundle Savings* by Agent
Mean Savings
Std.
p-Value
t
(%)
Deviation
(2-tailed)
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
12.19
8.65
-1.072
.290
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity
15.02
8.04
Expedia
10.64
9.18
Upper-class hotel &
-1.818
.077
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity
16.69
11.73
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
10.87
7.81
-2.495
.017*
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity
17.26
8.39
Upper-class hotel &
Expedia
11.75
12.45
-2.270
.029*
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity
21.65
15.01
Lower-class hotel &
Expedia
5.75
5.70
-3.794
.001*
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity
15.91
10.53
Upper-class hotel &
Expedia
6.51
6.44
-4.199
.000*
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity
17.84
9.95
* Bundle savings here means the savings in comparison with purchasing the component
products individually from the same agent.
Description

Bundle Savings by Destination
The effect of destination on bundle savings was tested using independent
samples t tests. As seen in Table 11 and 12, the two destinations differed significantly,
at least under some conditions, in yielding bundle savings. Orlando produced
significantly greater bundle savings for one-month and three-month advanced purchases,
while San Antonio produced greater bundle savings for six-month advanced purchse.
Although not throughly incorporated into the hypothesis, the seasonality of the
destination cities seems to result in these differences. Orlando hotels may have
relatively strong demand in winter, therefore they do not provide as much bundle
discounts as in the other seasons.
In addition, it is noticeable that these significant differences were observed only
in the lower-class hotel sectors. As shown in the tables, the bundle savings provided by
upper-class hotels were not different between the two destination cities.

37

Table 11: Absolute Bundle Savings by Destination
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Savings
Std.
p-Value
t
(USD)
Deviation
(2-tailed)
Orlando
159.47 138.16
2.171
.036*
San Antonio
88.19
49.63
Orlando
227.30 234.51
-.648
.521
San Antonio 272.49 205.47
Orlando
160.05 137.50
2.301
.027*
San Antonio
85.93
42.96
Orlando
392.95 470.40
-.098
.922
San Antonio 404.99 279.09
Orlando
74.21
81.99
-2.082
.044*
San Antonio 139.49 113.74
Orlando
284.38 318.22
-.325
.747
San Antonio 313.79 238.72

Table 12: Percentage Bundle Savings by Destination
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Savings
Std.
p-Value
t
(%)
Deviation
(2-tailed)
Orlando
16.26
9.75
2.092
.043*
San Antonio
10.95
5.80
Orlando
13.53
12.60
-.077
.939
San Antonio
13.80
9.07
Orlando
16.65
10.17
1.961
.057
San Antonio
11.48
5.94
Orlando
17.14
18.06
.192
.849
San Antonio
16.25
10.26
Orlando
7.55
6.90
-2.217
.033*
San Antonio
14.11
11.29
Orlando
10.42
10.10
-1.212
.233
San Antonio
14.32
9.98
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Bundle Savings by Hotel Segment
The effect of hotel segment on bundle discounts was tested using independent
samples t tests. As expected in the hypotheses, the results differed depending on
whether the discount was measured in absolute amount or percentage amount (See
Table 13 and 14). When measured in absolute amount, bundles including an upperclass hotel provide significantly greater discounts than bundles including a lower-class
hotel. In terms of percentage savings, however, there was no significant difference in
the magnitude of bundle savings between the two classes.

Table 13: Absolute Bundle Savings by Hotel Class
Description
One-month
advanced purchase
Three-month
advanced purchase
Six-month
advanced purchase

Mean Savings
(USD)
Lower-class
123.83
Upper-class
249.89
Lower-class
122.99
Upper-class
398.97
Lower-class
106.85
Upper-class
298.71

Std.
Deviation
108.64
218.83
107.33
381.82
103.30
279.01

t

p-Value
(2-tailed)

3.263

.002*

4.401

.000*

4.073

.000*

Table 14: Percentage Bundle Savings by Hotel Class
Description
One-month
advanced purchase
Three-month
advanced purchase
Six-month
advanced purchase

Mean Savings
(%)
Lower-class
13.61
Upper-class
13.66
Lower-class
14.07
Upper-class
16.70
Lower-class
10.83
Upper-class
12.32
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Std.
Deviation
10.84
8.36
8.63
14.51
9.82
10.10

t

p-Value
(2-tailed)

.026

.979

.986

.327

.663

.509

Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase
An one-way ANOVA was used to assess the impact of three timings of purchase
on the magnitude of absolute and percentage bundle savings. As presented in Table 15
and 16, the results failed to support the hypothesis that bundle savings vary significantly
in relation to how far in advance a travel is booked.
Although the relationship between the timing of purchase and bundle savings
was not significant, it would be an invalid argument to say that there are no differences
in bundle savings among different timings of purchase. This is because some factors
other than the timing of purchase may have affected the results, in different directions
and magnitudes, thereby making it impossible to observe solely the effect of the timing
on bundle savings. If the timing of purchase has been effectively decoupled from other
potential determinants of bundle savings, the results might have suggested significant
differences.
Table 15: Absolute Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Savings
(USD)

Std.
Deviation

123.83

108.64

122.99

107.33

106.85

103.30

249.89

218.83

398.97

381.82

298.71

279.01
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F

p-Value

.323

.724

2.548

.083

Table 16: Percentage Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase
Description
Lower-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Lower-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
1-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
3-month advanced purchase
Upper-class hotel &
6-month advanced purchase

Mean Savings
(%)

Std.
Deviation

13.61

8.36

14.07

8.63

10.83

9.82

13.66

10.84

16.70

14.51

12.32

10.10
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F

p-Value

1.525

.222

1.387

.254

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results of this exploratory study support the hypothesis that mixed
price bundling in the online travel market is normally presented with actual monetary
savings on bundle purchases. This paper also investigated whether the magnitude of
bundle discounts vary by four relevant variables such as travel agent, destination city,
hotel class, and the timing of purchase. The results demonstrate that at least the first
three variables have significant relationships with the magnitude of bundle discounts
provided to customers.
These findings has several important implications for price bundling
implemented in online travel markets. First, although a couple of factors (i.e., the
complementary relationship between bundled products and consumer difficulty in
assessing the actual amount of bundle discounts) may increase the consumer value of
purchasing a travel bundle, these effects seem not substantial enough to result in actual
bundle “premiums.” As a result, consumers can achieve actual monetary savings,
although the amount may vary case by case, by purchasing a travel bundle instead of
purchasing the component products individually from the same agent or the suppliers’
own websites.
Next, the results suggest significant differences in the use of price bundling
between the two online travel agents, Expedia and Travelocity. In general, Travelocity
seems to implement price bundling more extensively than Expedia, providing greater
consumer savings for wider array of travel bundles. It would be worth investigating in
future research what factors result in this difference. Based on the prior bundling
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literature (e.g., Guiltinan, 1987), one might hypothesize that Expedia is superior to
Travelocity in creating and presenting the complementary relationships between
bundled products, thereby being capable of selling even the same travel bundles with
relatively moderate discounts than its competitors. Alternatively, one might conjecture
that the differences of travel agents in terms of market presence or market share
empower (or urge) a travel agent to employ price bundling in different ways.
As to the effects of travel attributes on the magnitude of bundle savings, the
results suggest that the amounts of bundle savings are likely to vary by destination and
hotel class. In particular, the results indicate that travel bundles including upper-class
hotels tend to provide significantly greater “absolute” savings than bundles including
lower-class hotels. Given that the percentage savings do not differ significantly by
hotel class, the author conjecture that hotel firms and/or travel agents are simply
applying similar discount rates to all types of their bundles. If this is the case, the firms,
especially online travel agents, need to conduct research on consumer demand (i.e.,
reservation prices for individual products and bundles). Based on the information about
the distribution of consumer reservation prices for their individual products and bundles,
the firms could enhance the profitability of bundling strategy by applying different
discount rates to each segment.
As an exploratory study, this paper has several limitations that future research
could address. First, the independent variables in this study has very limited number of
values. In other words, the price data (i.e., dependent variables) ware collected from
only two online travel agents, for two destinations, for two hotel classes, and for three
timings of purchase. As a result, generalizing the results into the entire online travel
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industry may not be valid. For example, the results failed to find significant differences
in bundle savings among three different timings of purchase. However, if one tests the
same hypotheses for different time frames of purchasing (e.g., last minute or two weeks
ahead of departure), the results might indicate significant differences. Therefore, a
natural extension of this study will be one that examines similar hypotheses for more
various combinations of relevant independent variables, using sufficient numner of
observations for each condition.
One additional limitation of this study is that some other important variables,
which probably have significant influences on bundle savings offered at a specific time
for a specific destination, were not incorporated into or controlled by the tests. For
instance, seasonality of a destination may affect the bundle savings by timing of
purchase as well as by destination city. Because seasonality is generally destinationspecific and often difficult to quantify, controlling or including the seasonal effects
explicitly in the test should be challenging but worthwhile.
This paper documented theoretical rationales that can explain the prevalent use
of price bundling in the online travel industry. In addition, it has been examined
whether travel bundles are presented to consumers with actual monetary savings as
commonly believed or advertised, and whether the magnitude of the savings varys by
some relevant attributes of travel. Lastly, this paper has presented several important
implications and limitations of the findings, along with suggestions for future research.
The author hopes this study stimulates more advanced research and helps travel firms
make better decisions in offering and pricing their travel bundles.
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